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Abstract 
Transactions on biomedical research outcomes bring into play strategies that are 
determined by leveraging resources into quasi-markets and on options based on 
expectations. To govern such transactions, the choice of appropriate governance 
structures and the governance of interaction are all too often in remittance of risk 
and uncertainty. Organisation and communities are prompted by issues concerning 
intellectual property (IP) to underwrite information, which is inherently fraught with 
difficulties of discerning ownership and quantifying qualitative business variables. 
Against that backdrop, we enquire on the mechanisms underpinning value 
dissipation and value appropriation of biomedical research outcomes to make 
proposition on the organisational antecedence to innovation. It is a preamble study 
with the view to developing a meso-level framework to describe mechanisms of 
value appropriation of upstream biomedical (non-invasive) research at Public 
Research Organisation. Its underpinning is largely based on the availability 
appropriability regimes and viability of organizational governance decisions and 
how the choice of organizational governance form affects both the creation and 
appropriation of economic value. 
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I.                    Introduction 
Opportunities to generate and appropriate economic rents from biomedical research and development (R&D) 
exist because of competitive imperfections in factor or product markets. This can be achieved by utilizing 
isolation mechanisms, such as those protecting knowledge assets. Value isolating mechanisms impose 
constraints on information diffusion and can take many different forms, including patents, copyrights, non-
compete clauses, and so forth. They are means of protecting information and used as a tool by economic actors 
to prevent, or at least delay, duplication of its intellectual assets. This, in turn makes it possible to earn 
(temporary) monopoly rents, and also ancillary profits (such as licensing and routes to public funding). As a 
practical matter, knowledge protection has been traditionally linked to the notion of appropriability (Arrow, 
1962; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Zander and Kogut, 1995), which continues to be relevant (Arora, 1997; 
Pitkethly, 2001; Nieto and Pérez-Cano, 2004; Durack, 2004; Hurmelinna et al., 2007). However, the capacity of 
appropriability mechanisms (efficacy) to create temporary monopoly rents and other benefits for a firm 
(efficiency) contends with a well established view that knowledge emanating from research exhibit certain 
specific properties: uncertainty, inappropriability and indivisibility (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962, Lipsey and 
Carlaw, 1998). As a result, it is commonplace that appropriability attempts are inherently fraught with issues 
concerning valuation, particularly at the early phases when decision-making is under conditions of uncertainty 
about future prospects.  
 
Fundamentally, the ability to realize rent-generating potential poses problems concerning the assembly of 
necessary resources and to appropriate at least some of the rents that will be generated when they take advantage 
of these opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 2004). These involve issues of ownership and control that require 
the distinction between underlying knowledge, intellectual property (IP) assets and endowed rights, IP rights, 
(IPR) (Pitkethly, 2001). With the growing complexity of technological innovation that is spread over different 
stages in a value chain, appropriation is aggravated by the likelihood that many patents covering these 
technological components may be controlled by many different owners and can thus turn into IP roadblocks. 
The transaction associated costs has attracted concerns in biomedical research, where Heller and Eisenberg 
(1998) call this ‘the tragedy of the anti-commons’. 
 
Against that backdrop, appropriation concerns and coordination requirements have become powerful concepts in 
IP management by jointly describing the need to manage the creation and safeguard the appropriation of value 
(Tomkins, 2001). Competition, in turn, invokes an emphasis on the renewal of IP assets in accounts that takes 
heed of the increasingly discontinuous nature of innovations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Zahra and Nielsen, 
2002; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Markides and Geroski, 2003). The use of organizational forms such as 
distinctive use of networks and increasing employee mobility, further prompts issues concerning knowledge 
mobility and network stability (Pisano, 1990; Kale et al., 2000; Teece, 2000; Sakakibara, 2002; Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe, 2006). 
 
Appropriability has thus been identified as a strategic success factor for organisations that produce research and 
development (R&D). It includes the establishment of an effective an environmental factors, known as an 
appropriability regime, which can in turn facilitate taking profit from innovations (Teece, 1986: 610; Brockhoff, 
2003; Hurmelinna et al., 2007). 
 
Under such dynamic conditions and the rise of the university-industry collaboration, the management of IP 
assets and IPR deriving from research universities and research centres funded by public funds (collectively 
Public Research Organisations or PRO) have evolved from processes of (i) an “Open Science model”, in which 
PROs did not retain or enforced certain types of IPR, through (ii) a “Licensing Model” in which the PROs 
started to retain, protect and commercialise inventions based on their discoveries, essentially through licensing 
the IPR to industry or to start-up companies, and into (iii) the “Innovation Model” in which the licensing model 
has been supplemented by a active collaborative research with industry and a pro-active involvement in the 
creation of spinout companies (Roper et al., 2004; Siegel et al., 2003; Lee and Win, 2004; Gloet and Terziovski, 
2004; European Union, 2004). All three models are in use at PROs to strategically manage spill-over, and in 
turn provide a forum to acquire funding, incentive mechanisms and diffusion, both with regard to research 
findings in general and to particular innovative technologies that are ready for practical application. Within that 
remit, research at Universities has been acknowledged to be conducted within different frameworks of 
knowledge production systems, and ‘in the context of application’ (Gibbons et al, 1994; Huff, 2000; Nowotny et 
al, 2001; Kurek et al., 2007). 
 
  
Our study analyses the issue of appropriability and in particular of mechanisms carried out to earn quasi-rents in 
biomedical research outcomes. This work is mechanisms to organize rent generation and appropriation along 
three dimensions (1) the extent to which activities and the desired contributions are amenable to codification 
(ex-ante uncertainty); (2) the extent to which alternative uses of investment made to support the activities 
involve opportunity losses (the degree of asset specificity); and (3) the ability to assess the true quality of actual 
delivered performance of activities (ex post information asymmetry). The article is organised as follows: Section 
II establishes the background of the problem and framework for the enquiry, as well proposition that were 
enquired on. This is followed by a description of the sample of specialist and the empirical methodology 
followed in section III. Subsequently, we present our findings and discuss the main conclusions drawn from this 
in Section IV and suggest some directions for future research. 
 
 
II.                  Background 
II.I Biomedical Knowledge and IP 
Recent advances in biomedical sciences have changed the way in which innovation occurs. In what has been 
termed 'the information paradigm', the basis for appropriating value in biomedical-related information features 
static and dynamic elements, of which anticipated future prospects is augmented by an increasing degree of 
complementarities, applicability and centrality of biomedical research knowledge and disease processes, or 
opportunities for medical intervention from a functional perspective (Kost, 1995; Semsarian and Seidman, 2001; 
Massoud and Gambhir, 2003; Nunn, 2008; Blasberg, 2003; Jaffer and Weissleder, 2005;  Gross and Piwnica-
Worms, 2006). The dynamic conditions of upstream R&D is fitting to Eisenhart’s (1989) notion of high velocity 
and D’Aveni’s (1994) concept of hyper competition, where advancements are increasingly of a discontinuous 
nature. As a result, simultaneous innovation results in the fragmentation of IPR that is networked (Rahnasto, 
2003; Varian et al, 2004), and held by multiple owners. A recognition of this hold-up problem and, also of 
previous acknowledgment that know-how transfer underpins technological progress, enterprise growth and 
renewal, both inside and outside a firm (Harrigan and Dalmia, 1991; Appleyard, 1996; Zucker et al., 1996), has 
prompted the use organizational forms such as ‘networks’ to access new technologies and their associated 
know-how to improve innovation capacity (George et al, 2002, Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). As a result, 
task characteristics have been shown to influence appropriation concerns, as more complex and uncertain tasks 
lead to increasing contracting difficulties (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Anderson et al., 2000). Under the strains 
of technology and regulatory, pre-clinical development have less than a 1 percent chance of commercialization 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Tomkins (2001) described two similar management problems in relationships, 
alliances and networks, which he labels ‘the generation of trust’ (i.e. the management of appropriation concerns) 
and ‘the mastery of events’ (i.e. the coordination of activities). This resonates with previous findings the 
outcome, behaviour and social control are often equated with the conceptions of governance (Adler, 2001; 
Ouchi, 1979) and are useful mechanisms for both managing appropriation concerns and coordinating 
interdependent tasks. The network context of biomedical research brings into play the appropriation of IP assets 
emerging at the interstices of communities and networks of practice in upstream biomedical value chains 
(Scherer et al., 1959; Mansfield et al., 1981; Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Scherer and Ross, 1990; 
Arora, 1997; Grindley and Teece, 1997; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001; Ducor, 
2000; Tomkins, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Hertzfeld et al., 2006). Under such condition, 
coordination becomes imperative in the consideration of market failure (disclosure dilemma) or fears of 
opportunism (consequences of appropriation of knowledge by an alliance partner).   
 
Within that premise, Beugelsdijck and Cornet (2001) suggest a useful distinction between two types of 
knowledge spillover that is also useful in our context of study: rent-based spillovers mediated through market 
mechanisms, and pure knowledge spillovers which result from un-priced knowledge exchange. For this study, 
our interest is in the coordination of IP assets shaping both types of knowledge spill-over and their management 
(i.e. identification, development and exploitation) and how they facilitate the appropriation of value (Dietz and 
Bozeman, 2005). It is premised on the consideration of market failure (disclosure dilemma) and fears of 
opportunism (appropriation of knowledge by an alliance partner) and seeks to investigate how PROs deploy 
governance alternatives as a framework for appropriation by asking the following research question: 
 
1. How do available and effective means to protect intangibles and innovations facilitate the appropriation 
of value in upstream R&D? 
a. How does the choice of appropriation instruments strengthen the protection of IP assets?  
 
b. How the organisational structures impinge on appropriation efforts? 
 
To help answer these questions, we start by presenting available methods discussed in the extant literature and 
subsequently deduce our propositions. 
   II.II Appropriation  
Under the open, licensing and innovative models of University appropriation, economic actors can appropriate 
value in their biomedical research outcomes by participating in continuous innovation, which enables them to 
acquire and maintain a position of technological leadership (Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995; Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht, 1999; Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; West and Iansiti, 2003). By default, it can be assumed 
that scientific actors at PRO specialising on a subject-matter have expertise in that field. Coupled to bounded 
rationality and when scientific actors through specialisation are able to comprehend the underpinning of their 
subject area, the complexity of technology also becomes a viable mechanism of appropriation (March and 
Simon, 1958; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). The tacit nature of relevant knowledge underlying an 
intellectual asset implies that complexity serve an appropriation role due to tacitness, causal ambiguity, or social 
complexity (Barney, 1991; Nonaka, 1994). By virtue of their expertise, scientific actors may also be in 
possession of complementary assets critical for innovations and that has been shown to present a forum for 
appropriating value (Teece, 1987; Cohen et al., 2002; Nieto and Pérez-Cano, 2004; Galende, 2006). 
Fundamentally, it is both the choice and method of disclosure that may determine the effects of an 
appropriability regime on disclosed information. Nonetheless, as the decision to disclose information is often 
made early in the life of the information and under conditions of uncertainty, the true effect amongst the 
different mechanism often becomes known at later stages. Against that backdrop, there is an established view 
industrial secrets are of greater use as opposed to say patents as a protection mechanism (Harabi, 1995; Brouwer 
and Kleinknecht, 1999; Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; Davis, 2001; Hannah, 2005). However, as we shall 
come to discuss, this may not always the case. On the one hand, protection methods allow economic actors to 
prevent, or at least delay, duplication of its intellectual assets, which in turn makes it possible to earn 
(temporary) monopoly rents, and also ancillary profits (such as licensing). On the other hand, the current IP 
regime does not depart from its implicit function to serve as an organisational role of: (i) acting as an incentive 
system for innovation; (ii) packaging IP assets; (iii) diffusing technical information; and (iv) controlling IP 
assets. 
 
Ultimately, it is the use of IP asset in innovation and issues associated with its use that determines the due 
efficiency of an appropriability regime. According to Pitkethly (2001), the appropriation of value can be view 
along three dimensions (Figure 1): 
 
 
--------------------Insert figure 1------------------------ 
 
 
 
• Legal appropriability: value increases as its associated IPRs grow stronger because of a pronounced 
broadness of its asserted claims if the broad claims are enforceable. As a result, it is awkward for 
inventors who have to “work around” the patent; thus it deters imitation. 
 
• Strategic appropriability: value increases as a firm becomes more strategically effective at configuring 
the pattern of strategic resources necessary to market a product successful in the competitive arena of 
the value chain stage. Therefore, beyond legal appropriability and control over critical complementary 
assets, strategic appropriability is an essential consideration to competitive positioning within a given 
value chain. 
 
• Competitive position. Value increases as a firm becomes more capable within the competitive arena of 
a value chain stage of achieving a favourable position. Thus there is a historic element as value in use 
is moderated by the previous business success of a firm or productive entity.  
 
Among available and effective means of appropriating value, formal private property rights, especially patents, 
copyright, and trade secrets have been among the most studied mechanisms (e.g. Jain 1996; Arundel & Kabla 
1998; Arundel 2001; Pitkethly 2001; Knight 2001; Kelley & Rice 2002; Cohen et al. 2002; Gallini & 
Schotchmer 2002; Hannah 2005). For highly complex sectors such as the biomedical field, the tacit nature of 
knowledge is in itself a means of appropriation (Polanyi 1966; Lippman & Rumelt 1982; Nelson & Winter 
1982; Dierickx & Cool 1989; Barney, 1991; Zander & Kogut 1995; Teece 1988; 1998; Saviotti 1998). There is 
also the use of lead-time (Levin et al. 1987, 1988; Lieberman & Montgomery 1988; Schoonhoven et al. 1990; 
Mueller, 1997; Makadok 1998; Coerderoy & Durand 2004; Carow et al. 2004), which can be instrumental in 
both private and public domain. Time-critical claims to originality and authorship of knowledge, within the 
remit of both formal and informal rules governing such claims can also create a route to public funding for 
coming first. In the private domain, this is also critical form of appropriation, because IP erodes over time 
through circumvention, duplication and/or obsolescence. 
 
Human resource management and contracts are also a distinct means of appropriation, securing IP rights explicit 
terms (Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 1994; Baughn et al. 1997; Liebeskind 1997; Boxall, 1998). Finally, the use 
of practical and technical means of concealment such as encryption and firewalls are widely used both in private 
and public sectors (Davis, 2001; Hannah 2005). These are common for the protection of genomics and 
bioinformatics information, where it is commonplace to combine an open science model to click-wrap licensing.  
 
The combination of these forms in an appropriability regime underpins the protection of IP assets and 
innovations, their profitability, and the increased rents due to R&D (Teece 1984, 1986, 1988; Cohen & Walsh 
2001; Harvey and McMeekin, 2004). Their selection of an appropriate regime requires a distinction between IP 
assets and IPR to delineate ownership and control of underlying IP assets through legal enforcement and 
credible commitments. Under certain conditions, the type of IPR and a combination of other available methods 
may be required to attain sufficient protection. In particular, the network context of biomedical research also 
brings into play the appropriation of IP assets emerging at the interstices of communities and networks of 
practice in upstream biomedical value chains (Scherer et al., 1959; Mansfield et al., 1981; Mansfield, 1986; 
Levin et al., 1987; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Arora, 1997; Grindley and Teece, 1997; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001; Ducor, 2000; Tomkins, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2002; 
Hertzfeld et al., 2006). Under such condition, coordination becomes imperative in the consideration of market 
failure (disclosure dilemma) or fears of opportunism (consequences of appropriation of knowledge by an 
alliance partner).   
 
 
Summarised, a decision on which protection method to select depends on factors such as: 
• the institutional framework (Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Granstrand, 1999; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; 
Pitkethly, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; Hurmelinna et al., 2007);  
• the national and international legal system (Ordover, 1991; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Shapiro, 2001; 
Cohen et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Hurmelinna et al., 2007);  
• the structure of the industry in which (Scherer et al., 1959; Mansfield et al., 1981; Mansfield, 1986; 
Levin et al., 1987; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Arora, 1997; Grindley and Teece, 1997; Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Hertzfeld et 
al., 2006); 
• the dimensions of technological knowledge (Arora, 1997; Pitkethly, 2001; Nieto and Pérez-Cano, 
2004; Durack, 2004; Hurmelinna et al., 2007; Hertzfeld et al., 2006); 
• characteristics specific to innovation strategies (Levin et al., 1987; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen et 
al., 2000 and Cohen et al., 2002; Arundel, 2001; Galende, 2006) and  organisational resources (Maurer 
and Zugelder, 2000; Hurmelinna et al., 2007; Galende, 2006; Hertzfeld et al., 2006). 
 
 
 
III. Research model and propositions 
A determination of what can and should be appropriated requires an initial assessment of what rights are 
protectable through disclosure and what information qualifies as a trade secret. At PROs, several factors 
determine who owns the underlying IP assets and what right can be acquired. These factors include whether  
 
1. There are express or implied agreements to assign ownership  
2. The inventor is employed by the PRO 
3. The inventor made the invention within the scope of their employment  
4. Where and when the invention was made. 
 
The attributes of knowledge affect the organization and governance of transaction on information and has 
become a major challenge of appropriating biomedical information based on three key decisions: (i) whether or 
not to file for a patent; (ii) whether to market the invention to an existing firm or not; and finally (iii) how 
(temporary) monopoly rents and ancillary profits are to be structured. These decisions must be based on sound 
information about the market, the uniqueness and usefulness of the invention and/or technology, the likelihood 
of being able to obtain patent protection, factors related to the inventor, and the potential paradoxically impact 
of the of patenting on the institution’s responsibilities.  
 
Under the open, licensing and innovative models employed at PROs to manage their IP, a useful distinction is 
provided by Beugelsdijck and Cornet (2001), who distinguishes between rent-based spill-over mediated through 
market mechanisms and pure knowledge spill-over which result from un-priced knowledge exchange. In order 
words, disclosure may serve to signal and thereby reduce informational asymmetry between firms and outsiders, 
such as investors (Shapiro, 2001; Long, 2002). Disclosure may also serve multiple functions, for instance add 
value to the exploitation of undisclosed IP assets by making it readily exploitable to those who desire the 
underlying IP assets (Hargadon, 1998, 2003; Kodama, 1992). On that basis, the framework for the present study 
is the process by which research outcome (information- input) can be appropriated along three dimension 
(Strategic, legal, competitive) to acquire (temporary) monopoly rents, and also ancillary profits (figure 2). 
 
 
---------------------------Insert figure 2--------------------------- 
 
 
Implementing IP strategies focuses attention on the actual process of IP creation, development and protection 
(Hanel, 2006). First we distinguish between organisations. Differences in organisational context, and contrasts 
between the types of R&D being conducted in the different types of PROs, suggest our first set of propositions: 
 
Proposal 1: IP management practices will differ between university-based and research centres funded by 
public funds.  
 
Proposal 2: IP management practices will differ between university-based PROs depending on which IP model 
they adopt. 
 
Proposal 3: PROs will implement incentives for the creation and identification of IP which reflect the nature of 
the host organisation and the IP model being adopted. 
 
As suggested earlier, however, different types of PROs in different settings are likely to devote differing levels 
of resources to IP protection and development. For example- University based PROs may find it difficult to 
invest the level of resources necessary to protect their IP effectively and may adopt alternative commercial 
strategies to maintain their technological leadership (Blackburn, 2003; Bigliardi et al., 2006). This leads to us to 
make proposals on the use of appropriation mechanisms: 
  
Proposal 4:  Use of formal IP protection methods will depend on the organisational background of the PRO  
 
Proposal 5: PROs will use specialist services to support their IP protection and exploitation strategies. Use of 
these services will reflect the nature of the host organisation and the IP model being adopted. 
 
Inter-organizational innovation networks are providing opportunities to exploit superior resources that reside 
beyond the boundary of the firm (George et al, 2002, Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). The appropriability 
regime in an innovation network thus influence PROs appropriability regime, and is influenced by, network 
stability. Research has shown that equity often plays a critical role in enhancing both the appropriability 
environment and the stability of such relationship by mitigating the competitive dynamics and opportunistic 
behaviour that can lead to premature dissolution of alliances (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Park & Russo, 1996). In 
the context of this research, our focus is on joint asset ownership and we enquire on how they ensure equitable 
distribution of value in stable network, processes that enhance reputation and multiplexity not only induce 
stability in a network but also contribute to trust and openness within the network. This approach associates 
appropriability regime with networks, where it has been found that the strength of the appropriability regime and 
the stability of the network are mutually reinforcing and will have a reciprocal relationship (Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe, 2006). Thus, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 5: Innovation appropriability in an innovation network will positively impact knowledge mobility in 
the network. 
 
Proposition 6: Innovation appropriability will positively impact the stability of innovation networks. 
 
 
Proposition 7: Stability of innovation networks will positively impact the strength of innovation appropriability. 
 
 
Ex-ante codification (uncertainty), asset specificity (opportunism), and ex-post monitoring (information 
asymmetry) 
Given that appropriability can not be measured directly, we enquire appropriation using a framework 
characterised along three dimension- Ex-ante codification, asset specificity and ex-post information asymmetry 
(figure 3).  
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Upstream biomedical R&D is epitomised by scientific exchange of information that is often tacit and non-
proprietary. This type of knowledge is based on their expertise (Brockmann and Anthony, 2002; Dyer and 
Hatch, 2004; Howells, 1996; Roberts, 2000), of which wider legal definition is as follows:  
  
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique or process, that: 
  
(i)  derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtained economic value from its disclosure or use, 
and 
  
(ii)  is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.   
  
Know-how transfer underpins technological progress, enterprise growth and renewal, both inside and outside 
their own firm (Harrigan and Dalmia, 1991; Appleyard, 1996; Schrader, 1991; Zucker et al., 1996; George et al, 
2002, Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). It plays a crucial role in the pooling of assets and as an organizational 
level activity and portrayed as a ‘network approach’ to innovation (Hankasson, 1990; Bower, 1993; George et 
al, 2002, Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Coombs and Metcalfe, 2002). Previous work on the know-how 
transfer has focused on decision making cues founded on the expectation of reciprocity (Dutton and Jackson, 
1987; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Expanding on this view, recent work shows that the effects of different 
contextual cues, such as competitiveness, social relationship, boundaries within or across firm have a summative 
effect upon the expectation of reciprocity and know-how transfer (Kackra and White, 2008).  
 
In the context of this study, we are concerned in whether the flow of information is amenable to ex-ante 
codification (uncertainty), or becomes the subject of asset specificity (opportunism), and whether it can be 
monitored ex post (information asymmetry). By definition, know-how knowledge is tacit and as such difficult to 
codify (Schrader, 1991).  At the same time, its is not often subjected to formal bars. Rather, it is knowledge 
embedded in an individual’s concrete expertise (Hansen, 1999; Polanyi, 1966), and may not be documented 
from available sources. As a result, the appropriation of value in know-how requires an investment of time and 
resources to curtail an economic that may be uncertain and difficult to specify or value, ex ante (uncertainty) or 
to monitor and enforce ex post (information asymmetry) (Appleyard, 1996; Pfeffer, 1981; Schrader, 1991). Its 
transfer also may serve to establish a competitor (opportunism) with respect to exploitation of the underlying IP 
asset- know-how information. In other words, exclusive control over know-how information is difficult to 
maintain ex post monitoring.  
 
Spill-over can somewhat be control when know-how is made the subject of transaction. Confidentiality of the 
know-how information is typically one of the conditions under which trade secret information is transfer. 
However, if such trade secret information is not properly monitored, marked and otherwise kept secret by the 
recipient/licensee, there is a clear potential for its loss to third parties or spill-over. It creates a situation where 
no distinction can be drawn between rent-based spill-over mediated through market mechanisms and pure 
knowledge spill-over which result from un-priced knowledge exchange (Beugelsdijck and Cornet, 2001). In 
acknowledgment of this problem, organizational and transaction cost theorists argue that information and know-
how transfers are best handled within a firm’s boundaries, where the transaction costs associated with know-
how exchange may be lower than between firms (Allen and Cohen, 1969; Tushman, 1977; Von Hippel, 1987; 
Zucker et. al., 1996). The distinction between IP assets and IPR further emphasises that appropriation 
mechanism within corporate boundaries serves a better means of protecting information. For example, the SNP 
consortium achieves this by filing patents to maintain information as a pre-competitive resource using an open 
science model. Patents are filed as evidence of the date of discovery, prior to releasing information, but are later 
abandoned and ensuring a specific depiction of – copyright- to serve its intended purpose.  
This leads us to propose that: 
 
Proposal 8: Internally deployed mechanism better serves the purpose of appropriating value in upstream R&D 
knowledge/ information prior to transfer.  
 
When the know-how is explicit, proprietary, such as is the case with patent, an exclusive right of limited 
duration over a new, non-obvious invention of industrial application, is granted in return of publication of the 
invention. Here, the distinction between underlying IP assets and IPR presents an opportunity to refer 
specifically to a particular embodiment on which exclusive rights is to be sought and to different embodiments 
may be referred to in the underlying IP asset. In preparing a patent application, some of the knowledge becomes 
codified and its potential becomes clearer- an example of ex-ante codification. An effect of ex-ante codification 
is that the knowledge attribute of information about the underlying IP asset may mean that information 
asymmetries between managers-scientist and manager-investors (as well as rivals) may persist well after 
knowledge is codified in a patent application. In order words, the knowledge creation process begins with tacit 
knowledge, which implies that lead-time can serve as an asset accumulation or appropriation means supported 
by the scientist and for that matter serve as an isolation mechanism to keep technologies from rivals (Nonaka, 
1994; Polanyi, 1962; Dierickx and Cool’s, 1989). Moreover, a disclosed inventive step linking different 
embodiments can be viewed as signals of future economic performance, for which an open reflection of codified 
knowledge representing an underlying tacit and complex knowledge may be critical to subsequent innovations 
or to commercialization (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Long, 2002). The tacitness of 
this information at the early stages of appropriation ensue that value is retained up until the decline of 
information asymmetric with rival. On that, we propose that  
 
Proposal 9: The combination of legal enforcement (trilateral) and credible commitments (bilateral) serves a 
greater purpose of appropriating value. 
  
Fundamentally, disclosure serve the purpose of signalling (Long, 2002), and given the informational asymmetry 
between PRO and outsiders, PROs need to signal their expertise and use the IPR system to do this. Patents, in 
particular, are costly to acquire and undergo an external quality check, hence they act as good signals, allowing 
firms to raise finance or attract talented employees. On the hand, know-how has been shown to play a role in 
leveraging business resources (Teece, 1987; Cohen et al., 2002; Nieto and Pérez-Cano, 2004; Galende, 2006). 
The signal effect of disclosure presents a forum to collaborate with others. The profitable transfer of ideas from 
where they are known to where they represent more innovative possibility conjure value creation and the 
appropriation of value, as well as quicken the pace of innovation (Hargadon, 1998, 2003; Kodama, 1992). On 
that note, we propose that: 
 
 
Proposal 10: Know-how transfer, predicated on appropriation regime will positively impact value creation 
Know-how has been acknowledged to flows best through trusting communities (Adler, 2001), where strong 
social relationships between individuals are often associated with the transfer of complex knowledge (Hansen, 
1999; Szulanski, 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). In view of the foregoing, we propose that 
  
Proposal 11: Know-how transfer, predicated on appropriation regime will positively impact the stability of 
partnership 
 
The effect of rival's patent gives an advantageous position to the detriment of the focal firm, with ‘spill-over’ 
effects, when a breakthrough by a rival firm triggers greater technological opportunity and provides information 
on which the focal firm can build. Strategically, the possibility of technology spill-overs is increased since, 
before a patent can be granted, the inventor must make public detailed technical information about the 
invention, including claims of novelty. Therefore information asymmetry between inventors is reduced, which 
Scotchmer (1991) describes using the phrase ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ as a means to describe the 
phenomenon of an inventor who achieves the last stage in a breakthrough. This can play a role in strategically 
appropriation to carve the way for asserting a competitive position even where others have contributed many of 
the fundamental building blocks of the technology. Thus, we propose that: 
 
Proposal 12: Legal appropriation has a positive impact on strategic appropriation   
 
This type of activity is reminiscent of the innovative model and participation can serve the purpose of allowing 
PROs to play a part in broader technology-exchange agreements between large firms, also known as ‘patent 
pools’ (Baumol, 2002). This not only provides PROs in the patent pool with a degree of protection against firms 
outside the technology agreement, but also counters the effect of creating a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001).  
 
Proposal 12: Legal appropriation has a positive impact on competitive positioning   
 
Within the framework of open, licensing and innovative models, there are therefore several possibilities to 
appropriate vale in research outcomes.  
 
 
IV.                  Conclusion and future work 
It was implicit in our analysis that the mechanism of appropriation and capacity of certain appropriability 
mechanisms can take several dimensions. This is in acknowledgement that knowledge emanating from research 
exhibit certain specific properties: uncertainty, inappropriability and indivisibility (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962, 
Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998). Therefore appropriability serves to enable to the distinguishing between the 
governance of choice and interaction by way of legal enforcement and credible commitments as a mechanism of 
modulating rent-based spillovers mediated through market mechanisms, and pure knowledge spillovers which 
result from un-priced knowledge exchange (Beugelsdijck and Cornet, 2001). 
The next logical step in our analysis is to builds theory from the framework looking at the mediation of open, 
licensing and innovative models deployed at PROs to manage IP assets. Starting point for the theoretical base of 
the study is a process model of entrepreneurial processes based on social system theory, which is used in the 
research program of Nikos (Groen, 2005). This will be combined by insights from technology dynamics (Rip 
and Groen, 2001). Actions of actors involved in the development networks will be analysed on the basis of the 
four function model underlying the social system theory (goal attainment, pattern maintenance, adaptation, 
integration). The combination allows for a study of strategic, cultural, social, economic and technological value 
creation aspects of business development processes (Groen, et al, 2002).  
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